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Abstract 
This report assesses the impact of several representative policy instruments on 
sustainability indicators in the areas of climate change and security of energy supply, 
two important dimensions of sustainable development addressed in the MINIMA-SUD 
project sponsored by the European Commission (DG Research). Specifically, we pay 
attention to the effectiveness of these policy instruments in stimulating technological 
change that could lead to a more secure and climate-benign global energy system in the 
long-term future. For such purpose, we examine the incremental change in a number of 
sustainability indicators when the policy instrument is applied relative to the costs of 
application of the instrument. This measure is referred to as the “impact” of the policy 
instrument. We concentrate our attention on the following policy instruments: Energy-
related demonstration and deployment (D&D) programs and a carbon-equivalent (C-eq) 
tax. 
Impact assessment of policy instruments is an important element of the policy 
development process of the European Commission, among others. It represents a 
systematic and careful attempt to shed light on the possible effects of policy proposals. 
As such, it serves as an aid to the decision-making process. Specifically, impact 
assessment of policy instruments plays an important role in the implementation of the 
sustainable-development strategy of the European Commission. Although the numerical 
results presented here are specific to our particular analysis and highly dependent on the 
characteristics and limitations of our modeling tools, we want to offer this analysis as a 
contribution towards the development of more comprehensive methodologies for the 
assessment of impacts of policy instruments in the context of the quest towards a 
sustainable global energy system. 
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Impact assessment of energy-related policy instruments on 
climate change and security of energy supply 
Leonardo Barreto and Hal Turton 
1. Introduction 
Defining and measuring sustainable development indicators and identifying instruments 
that could promote sustainability in different domains has become an important task for 
a number of social actors at the regional, national and international levels (e.g., Parris 
and Kates, 2003). Energy is one important element of sustainability. Driving the global 
energy system into a sustainable path is progressively becoming a major concern and 
objective for policy makers (IEA, 2001; Schrattenholzer et al., 2004). The emergence of 
a sustainable global energy system, however, is a gradual long-term process that will 
require a profound transformation of its current structure. 
Climate change and security of energy supply have high priority in national and 
international policy-making agendas. The increasing evidence of human-induced 
interference with the earth’s climate system and mounting concerns about potentially 
serious future adverse impacts make global climate change one of the most important 
challenges of sustainable development in the long term (IPCC, 2001a). In this regard, 
the global energy system plays a major role, since energy-related fossil-fuel combustion 
contributes a substantial share of anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
Thus, climate policy calls for, among others, the investigation of alternatives for energy 
production, conversion and final use with a low release of greenhouse gases to the 
atmosphere (e.g., IPCC, 2001b; Hoffert et al., 2002; Hasselmann et al., 2003). 
On the other hand, security of energy supply has become a more pressing concern for 
policy makers in view of a number of structural weaknesses in this area. An excessive 
reliance on fossil fuels, oil and natural gas in particular, is an issue of concern because 
of the economic, physical and geopolitical risks associated with it (EC, 2001). 
Specifically, the current overall dependence of OECD countries on oil supply from 
politically-volatile regions and the definition of appropriate responses to potential 
supply disruptions remain difficult issues (e.g., DOC, 1999; EC, 2001; IEA, 2001). 
Technological change has been recognized as both a key driving force of the 
anthropogenic contribution to climate change and an important instrument for 
mitigation and adaptation to climate change (IPCC, 2001b; Nakićenović, 2003). In a 
GHG mitigation strategy, no single technology can play the role of a “magic bullet”. 
Thus, a broad portfolio of technologies is needed if long-term goals are to be met 
(Edmonds, 2001; Hoffert et al., 2002). Technological change plays also an important 
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role in security of energy supply. In the long-term, the technological trajectory of the 
global energy system will have a significant influence on the resulting dependence from 
particular primary-energy resources and/or world regions supplying them. A sound 
concept of security of energy supply calls for, among others, a diversification of 
technologies and energy sources (EC, 2001). 
Impact assessment is an important element of the policy development process of the 
European Commission (EC, 2002). It represents a systematic and careful attempt to 
shed light on the possible effects of policy proposals. As such, it serves as an aid to the 
decision-making process. Specifically, impact assessment plays an important role in the 
implementation of the sustainable-development strategy of the European Commission. 
This report examines the impact of several representative policy instruments on 
sustainability indicators in the areas of climate change and security of energy supply, 
two important dimensions of sustainable development addressed in the EC-sponsored 
MINIMA-SUD project.1 In particular, we pay attention to the effectiveness of these 
policy instruments in stimulating technological change that could lead to a more secure 
and climate-benign global energy system in the long-term future. For such purpose, we 
examine the incremental change in a number of sustainability indicators when the policy 
instrument is applied relative to the costs of application of the instrument. In what 
follows, this measure is referred to as the “impact” of the policy instrument. 
We concentrate our attention on the following policy instruments: Energy-related 
demonstration and deployment (D&D) programs and a carbon-equivalent (hereon 
referred to as C-eq) tax. The effects of D&D programs are examined using the notion of 
“shocks”, i.e., small one-off incremental variations in the cumulative capacity of a given 
technology (see Turton and Barreto (2004) for a discussion). As for the C-eq tax, the 
response to a wide range of values is analyzed. The use of a C-eq tax allows non-CO2 
abatement opportunities to compete with energy system abatement, forest sinks and 
carbon capture and storage (CCS). 
The climate change indicators considered here are as follows: atmospheric 
concentrations of CO2 and CH4, global temperature change and global sea-level rise. 
These indicators are reported for the year 2100. The indicators for security of energy 
supply are long-term global resources-to-production (denoted here as Ru/P) ratios for 
oil and natural gas, both of them reported for the year 2050. 
Climate change and security-of-supply are complex challenges encompassing many 
aspects and achieving sustainability goals in these areas will require a portfolio of 
policy instruments. Therefore, it is also of interest to assess the combined effects of 
different policy instruments. Here, we examine how a combination of different C-eq tax 
levels and D&D programs would affect sustainability indicators in these two areas. 
The analysis is performed with the the “bottom-up” energy-system ERIS model, which 
has been linked to the climate model MAGICC (Wigley and Raper, 1997; Wigley, 
2003; see also Hulme et al., 2000). A detailed description of the energy-system ERIS 
model can be found in Turton and Barreto (2004). 
                                               
1
 The acronym MINIMA-SUD stands for Methodologies for Integrated Impact Assessment in the field of 
Sustainable Development. 
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The remainder of this document is organized as follows. Section 2 and section 3 briefly 
introduce the indicators of climate change and security of energy supply considered in 
this exercise and discuss the corresponding “instrument-to-indicator” causal chains. 
Section 4 presents a brief discussion of the baseline case, which provides the context for 
the discussion of results in subsequent sections. Section 5 presents an analysis of the 
impact of a carbon (equivalent) tax on the above-mentioned sustainability indicators. 
Section 6 assesses the impact of demonstration and deployment (D&D) shocks on the 
same indicators. Section 7 examines the effects of a combination of carbon taxes and 
D&D shocks and the derivation of the corresponding “impact surfaces”. Finally, section 
8 outlines some conclusions. 
2. Indicators of Climate Change 
Among other sustainability indicators, the MINIMA-SUD project addresses climate 
change. There is increasing evidence of anthropogenic interference with the Earth’s 
climate system and mounting concerns about possible serious adverse impacts of future 
global climate change (IPCC, 2001a,b). Thus, mitigation and adaptation to climate 
change constitute important aspects of a transition to sustainability in the long term. 
Figure 1 presents a simplified representation of the economic-climate cause and effect 
chain considered in this study. That is, from socio-economic driving forces (in particular 
technological change in energy systems) to climate variables, assuming that all 
concentration changes act on climate change via radiative forcing. No subsequent steps 
in the causal chain, such as climate change impacts or damages are considered here. 
Also, except for the impact of temperature on the terrestrial carbon cycle, a once-
through chain has been assumed, with no feedbacks from climate variables to driving 
forces.  
Socio-economic         
Driving Forces
Emissions (CO2, CH4, N2O, 
PFC, NOx, SO2, ..)
Atmospheric Concentrations
Radiative Forcing
Climate Variables: 
Temperature Change        
Sea Level Rise
Increasing
Uncertainty
Increasing
Relevance
 
Figure 1: The cause-effect chain from driving forces to climate change considered here (adapted 
from IPCC, 2001b and Fuglestvedt et al., 2003). It is assumed that all atmospheric concentration 
changes act on climate change via radiative forcing. Other than temperature feedbacks on 
terrestrial carbon cycle, a once-through causal chain has been assumed. 
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According to their relevance, current use in the climate change debate and 
measurability, the following climate change indicators have been chosen: Global 
emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O), 
concentrations of CO2, CH4 and N2O in the atmosphere, radiative forcing, annual-mean 
global temperature change and global-mean sea level rise. These indicators allow an 
aggregate but meaningful characterization of climate change at the global level and have 
been widely recognized and used, in particular by the IPCC (1996, 2001b). Despite their 
aggregate character, these indicators have a straightforward interpretation and allow an 
adequate examination of the effects of alternative policies on climate change at the 
global scale. 
CO2 is the largest historical contributor to climate change and will most likely continue 
to have a very important relative role in the future. CH4 and N2O are the two main non-
CO2 GHGs. The atmospheric concentrations and radiative forcing of these three GHGs 
have been increasing as a result of human activities (IPCC, 2001b). Our modeling 
framework endogenizes these three main GHGs, although we concentrate mainly on the 
contribution of the global energy system. Exogenous assumptions are made for other 
GHGs. 
Along the cause-effect chain in Figure 1 above, uncertainties increase as one moves from 
GHG
 
emissions towards climate variables. Three key uncertainties have been identified. 
The first of these is the magnitude of the CO2 fertilization effect, determined with 
reference to the average deforestation rate during the 1980s, which plays a key role in 
determining the future atmospheric concentrations of CO2. Second is the climate 
sensitivity, i.e., the long-term (equilibrium) change in global mean surface temperature 
following a doubling of atmospheric equivalent CO2 concentration (IPCC, 1996), which 
is a key parameter in translating a given amount of radiative forcing into a 
corresponding temperature change. The third key source of uncertainty is the impact of 
aerosols on radiative forcing. 
Figure 2 presents the instrument to indicator chain for the climate change objective. 
Essentially, demonstration and deployment (D&D) programs can stimulate the 
technology learning of low-emissions energy technologies, bringing cost reductions and 
other performance improvements. This makes those technologies more cost-effective 
and attractive in the marketplace, leading to their diffusion, initially in niche markets 
and later in broader markets. The imposition of a carbon-equivalent tax, on the other 
hand, provides an incentive for the adoption of technologies with lower associated GHG 
emissions. As a result of the diffusion of low-emissions energy technologies, the global 
energy system emits a smaller amount of GHG to the atmosphere, thereby leading to 
lower atmospheric GHG concentrations. All other things being equal, lower GHG 
concentrations result in a lower radiative forcing and a smaller increase in temperature 
and sea level. 
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Figure 2: Instrument-to-indicator chain for the climate change objective. 
3. Indicators of Security of Energy Supply 
Security of energy supply has revived as a major concern for policy makers, in 
particular in OECD countries. Specifically, considerable debate has taken place in the 
European Union (EU) on how to address the geopolitical shortcomings of its energy 
supply (EU, 2001) which is still mainly based on fossil fuels, a large fraction of which 
are imported. 
Although it appears that the global fossil fuel resource base is abundant when 
conventional and unconventional reserves and resources are taken into account (e.g., 
Rogner, 1997, 2000), the distribution of those resources, oil in particular, is 
geographically unequal. A large fraction of the currently known oil reserves and 
resources is concentrated in politically unstable regions. But, in the long-term, 
alternative development paths of the global energy system could lead to very different 
patterns of dependence on energy imports across regions. Specifically, development and 
deployment of technology clusters able to use primary energy resources indigenous to a 
given region may lead to a reduced dependence on imported energy carriers. 
It has been argued that the current patterns of use of fossil resources are not sustainable. 
Global long-term resource-to-production (Ru/P) ratios have been proposed as a proxy 
indicator of the sustainability of a given development path of the global energy system, 
based on the rationale that if those resources stay in the ground the environmental and 
social effects associated with their extraction are avoided (see Schrattenholzer et al., 
2004 for a discussion).  
Here, following Schrattenholzer et al. (2004) we use long-term global resource-to-
production (Ru/P) ratios both as an aggregate indicator of the availability of fossil 
resources and, therefore, of the security-of-supply of these fuels at the world level and 
as a proxy indicator for one important aspect of sustainability of the global energy 
system, namely the use of non-renewable resources. It must be noted, however, that this 
indicator depends on assumptions on the available fossil resource base. The long-term 
global Ru/P ratio is only applied to oil and gas. In the case of coal, although the Ru/P 
ratio would provide an indicator of sustainability, relatively abundant reserves and 
resources mean there are few issues of security of energy supply. It must be noted, 
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however, that this is an indicator of physical, and not economic, dependence. Also, it 
must be emphasized, that this is an indicator of dependence, rather than vulnerability 
(for a discussion, see e.g., Kendell, 1998). 
Clearly, assumptions on the resource base and its geographical distribution constitute 
one of the main uncertainties in the computation of these indicators. The availability of 
fossil resources is a function of both geological uncertainty and economic attractiveness. 
However, in the long term, technological change may substantially alter the picture by 
improving the ability to identify, quantify and access resources, which together will also 
increase the economic attractiveness of those resources (Rogner, 1997, 2000). The pace 
and direction of technological change are, however, highly uncertain. 
Figure 3 presents the instrument-to-indicator chain for the security-of-energy-supply 
objective. In broad terms, the policy instruments may stimulate the diffusion of more 
efficient fossil-based or non-fossil-based technologies, both of which have the potential 
to reduce total fuel consumption and facilitate a substitution away from imported fuels 
towards indigenous regional resources (including renewables, uranium and coal). As a 
result, technology diffusion can lead to reduced global consumption of highly traded 
fossil fuels (oil, gas), thus leading to an increase in global long-term Ru/P ratios and/or 
a reduction in the regional (physical) import dependence. It must be noted, however, 
that some technological paths may bring synergies between the climate change and the 
security-of-energy-supply objectives as measured in this study while others could be 
beneficial for one of them and detrimental to the other. 
Cost 
reductions
Carbon-
equivalent 
Taxes
Diffusion of 
non-fossil or 
more efficient 
technologies or 
technologies 
using 
indigenous 
resources
Lower 
consumption 
and imports of 
fossil fuels    
(oil, gas)
Impacts on security 
of energy supply: 
Long-term global 
Ru/P ratios, Regional 
consumption/produc-
tion ratios
Instruments
Indicators
D&D 
Programs
Spillovers from 
other energy 
technologies
 
Figure 3: Instrument-to-indicator chain for the security of energy supply objective. 
4. The Baseline Scenario 
In order to give an adequate context to our analysis, in this section we describe the main 
characteristics of our baseline scenario, as quantified with the ERIS-MAGICC modeling 
framework. Basic economic, population, energy demands and technology assumptions 
of this scenario are described in Turton and Barreto (2004). 
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In the baseline scenario, the world production of primary-energy resources experiences 
a substantial increase, reaching approximately 60 TWyr by the end of the 21st century 
(Figure 4).2 Both oil and coal experience a sizeable growth in this scenario. Natural gas 
plays the role of a transition source and its production increases substantially during the 
21st century but declines towards the end of it, as the (assumed) resource base is 
exhausted. Although fossil fuels remain dominant, renewables, biomass in particular, 
and nuclear energy experience a substantial growth in the second half of the 21st 
century. 
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
Pr
o
du
ct
io
n 
o
f P
rim
ar
y-
En
er
gy
 R
es
o
u
rc
es
 
(G
W
yr
)
Uranium
Other Renewables
Biomass
Oil
Natural Gas
Coal
 
Figure 4: Global production of primary energy resources in the baseline scenario. 
By the end of the 21st century, global electricity generation reaches over nine times its 
level in the year 2000 (Figure 5). The rapidly-increasing electricity demand is covered 
by a diversified set of generation technologies. Non-fossil technologies substantially 
augment their contribution to electricity supply in the long term. On the one hand, both 
standard and advanced nuclear designs gain sizeable shares of electricity production in 
the long run. On the other hand, although individual renewable-based technologies do 
not attain a large share of the generation mix, the renewable-based technology cluster as 
a whole captures a significant fraction of the global electricity production. Among 
others, biomass gasification plants, wind turbines and solar thermal plants are deployed. 
Nonetheless, fossil-fired generation still supplies a sizeable share of the global 
electricity mix. Installations of conventional coal-fired power plants vigorously grow 
during the 21st century. Advanced coal-based gasification technologies make some 
inroads towards the end of the century. Combined-cycle gas turbines experience a 
significant growth in the medium term but are displaced by other technologies such as 
gas fuel cells, renewable-based technologies and nuclear power plants in the long run. 
                                               
2
 One TWyr is equivalent to 31.54 EJ. 
IR_05_002.doc  8
0
3000
6000
9000
12000
15000
18000
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
G
lo
ba
l E
le
ct
ric
ity
 
G
e
n
e
ra
tio
n
 (G
W
yr
) HEF
STC
ORE
WND
SPV
STH
HYD
NNU
NUC
BIP
GFC
GTR
GSC
GCC
OLC
HCA
HCC
 
Figure 5: Global electricity generation mix in the baseline scenario. The technology 
abbreviations are as follows: HCC: conventional coal, HCA: advanced coal (IGCC), OLC: oil 
conventional, GCC: gas combined-cycle, GSC: gas steam cycle, GTR: gas turbine, GFC: gas 
fuel cell, BIP: biomass gasification, NUC: nuclear conventional, NNU: new nuclear, HYD: 
hydro, STH: solar thermal, SPV: solar photovoltaics, WND: wind turbine, ORE: other 
renewables, HEF: hydrogen fuel cell. 
Fuel production in this scenario remains dominated by oil products (Figure 6). 
Nonetheless, synthetic fuels are able to capture some market share in the second half of 
the 21st century. Specifically, the production of coal-based Fischer-Tropsch liquids 
increases, especially in regions with abundant indigenous coal resources (e.g., China). 
In addition, hydrogen from coal and, to a lower extent, biomass penetrates in the long 
term alongside with alcohol from biomass. Notice that, in this scenario, natural gas is 
mainly converted to electricity or directly used in stationary sectors or in gas-powered 
vehicles. Therefore, only a very small fraction of natural gas is used for the production 
of synthetic fuels. 
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Figure 6: Global production of fuels in the baseline scenario. 
As described in Turton and Barreto (2004), the ERIS model introduces technology 
clusters, for example, groups of technologies that share key learning components. As a 
reference for our discussion below, Figure 7 presents the cumulative installations of the 
key components relative to their cumulative capacity in the year 2000 in our baseline 
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scenario. As can be seen, already in the baseline scenario several of the learning 
components experience substantial progress along their learning curves. For the list of 
key components and how they relate to technologies in the ERIS model see the 
appendix. 
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Figure 7: World cumulative installations of key components under the baseline scenario. 
Cumulative capacity is relative to that in the year 2000 (set to 1 as reference). The abbreviations 
of the key components are as follows: FC: Fuel cell, SFC: Stationary fuel cell, GT: gas turbine, 
GA: gasifier, SR: Steam or auto-thermal reformer, AN: Advanced nuclear, AP: Solar 
photovoltaics, AW: Wind turbines, HY: Hybrid battery system, CA: CO2 adsorption and 
stripping, Note: the Y-axis scale in this graph is logarithmic. For the relation between learning 
components and technologies see the appendix. 
We now briefly discuss the technological transition in the passenger car sector under 
our baseline scenario. There are three main kinds of competing technologies, namely 
internal-combustion-engine vehicles (ICEVs), today’s dominant technology, hybrid-
electric vehicles (HEVs), an advanced technology that may be at least partially 
compatible with today’s technological regime, and fuel-cell vehicles (FCVs), an 
advanced revolutionary technology that requires the emergence of a new technological 
regime. Our scenario portrays a gradual, measured technological transition in the 
passenger car sector (Figure 8). The petroleum-fired internal combustion engine is 
gradually displaced by more advanced technologies along the 21st century. Specifically, 
there is a shift to hybrid-electric vehicles (HEVs), which achieve 50% market share 
around 2070-80. In terms of fuels, a more diversified passenger car sector emerges as 
well. Specifically, although at the end of the 21st century petroleum-based HEVs 
dominate and conventional petroleum-based internal combustion engines still hold a 
residual share of about 20%, gas- and alcohol-powered HEVs make sizeable inroads in 
the passenger car market. Fuel-cell vehicles achieve only a very small penetration of the 
market in this slow-transition scenario (0.5%, mainly hydrogen fuel-cell vehicles). 
Figure 9 shows the carbon-equivalent of CO2, CH4 and N2O emissions in the baseline 
scenario. The total emissions of these three GHGs increase substantially along the time 
horizon, peaking at about 29 GtC-eq3 around the year 2090 and leveling afterwards. The 
                                               
3
 Here, the unit ton refers to metric tons. 
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largest contribution is that of CO2 emissions, which reach approximately 24 GtC-eq at 
their peak in the year 2090.4 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
Sh
ar
e 
o
f P
as
se
ng
er
 
Ca
r 
Tr
av
e
l (
%
)
HFC
AFC
PFC
IHH
IAH
IGH
ICH
ICA
ICG
ICC
 
Figure 8: Share of global car travel by drive-train technology and fuel in the baseline scenario. 
Abbreviations of technologies are as follows: ICC: internal combustion conventional (gasoline), 
ICG: internal combustion gas, ICG: internal combustion alcohol, ICH: internal combustion 
(gasoline) hybrid, IGH: internal combustion gas hybrid, IAH: internal combustion alcohol 
hybrid, IHH: internal combustion hydrogen hybrid, PFC: petroleum fuel cell, AFC: alcohol fuel 
cell, HFC: hydrogen fuel cell. Note: dotted shading indicates ICEVs, diagonal shading indicates 
HEVs, and each FCV technology is indicated with either no (petroleum), medium (hydrogen) or 
dark (alcohol) shading. 
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Figure 9: Global emissions of CO2, CH4 and N2O (C-eq) in the baseline scenario. Abbreviations 
for the emission sources are as follows: CO2: CO2 from energy-related activities and cement 
production, CH4COAL: CH4 from coal production, CH4GAS: CH4 from gas production, 
CH4OIL: CH4 from oil production, CH4LF: CH4 from land fills, CH4MAN: CH4 from manure, 
CH4NA: Non-abated CH4, N2O: N2O from adipic and nitric acid production, N2ONA: Non-
abated N2O. 
                                               
4
 As discussed in Turton and Barreto (2004), marginal abatement curves (MACs) for CH4 and N2O 
emissions from a number of sources are specified in the ERIS model, following the study by EPA (2003). 
However, abatement cost curves were not available for several significant sources – notably enteric 
fermentation and agricultural soils (N2O) and some sources of CH4– and it is conservatively assumed that 
there are no abatement opportunities associated with these activities. In this report, these categories are 
referred to as non-abated (NA). 
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Using the emission profiles for the three main GHGs, CO2, CH4, N2O, and sulfur 
dioxide (SO2) computed by ERIS, together with assumptions about the emission 
pathways of other GHGs5, the atmospheric concentrations of CO2, CH4 and N2O as well 
as global temperature change and global sea-level rise are computed with the climate 
MAGICC model (version 4.1, Wigley, 2003). The MAGICC runs have been carried out 
assuming a CO2 fertilization effect of 1.1 GtC/year, a climate sensitivity of 2.6 oC and 
aerosol radiative forcings of -0.4 W/m2 (direct),-0.8 W/m2 (indirect) and -0.2 W/m2 
(biospheric) respectively. 
Figure 10 presents the corresponding concentrations of these three GHGs in the 
atmosphere. Concentrations of CO2 and CH4 increase rapidly in this scenario, reaching 
approximately 850 ppmv and 3200 ppbv respectively by the year 2100. N2O 
concentrations grow much slower and reach approximately 470 ppbv by the end of the 
21st century. Notice that the MAGICC model computes changes from a reference 
historical level in the year 1990. 
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Figure 10: Concentrations of CO2 (ppmv), CH4 (ppbv) and N2O (ppbv) for the baseline 
scenario, computed with the MAGICC climate model. Historical values are shown as reference. 
Source: CDIAC, 2003. 
Under this scenario, annual global temperature change and annual global sea level 
steadily rise along the 21st century (Figure 13). By the end of the 21st century, global 
temperature change reaches 3.4 oC and sea-level rise amounts to approximately 43 cm, 
both relative to year-1990 levels. Due to the large inertia and long time scales inherent 
to the response of the oceans to a climate forcing, which are much larger than those of 
the atmospheric system (IPCC, 2001a), the global sea level rises at a somewhat slower 
pace than global temperature. 
                                               
5
 The MAGICC climate model requires emission pathways for other GHGs, which are not computed by 
the ERIS model. In this case, they have been taken from the IPCC/SRES B2 scenario as quantified with 
the MESSAGE and AIM models (SRES, 2000). 
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Figure 11: Annual global temperature change and annual global sea-level rise for the baseline 
scenario, as obtained with the MAGICC climate model. Note: changes are relative to the year 
1990. 
We now turn to the indicators of security of energy supply, for example, the global 
resources-to-production ratios (hereon referred to as Ru/P ratio) of oil and natural gas. 
In this analysis, we compute the ratio between the fossil resource base, specified in the 
model following the categorization of Rogner (1997, 2000)6, and the global production 
of primary fossil fuels in a given time period (the year 2050 in our case). 
It should be noticed that the indicator used here does not correspond to the conventional 
notion of reserves-to-production ratio, which considers only the proven reserves today. 
The reason why we have chosen to compute a resources-to-production ratio (Ru/P) 
instead of the more commonly used reserves-to-production ratio is the deterministic 
treatment of fossil reserves and resources in the ERIS model. That is, the categories 
included in the model are assumed to be available for the whole optimization period, 
only at a higher extraction cost. If they become cost-effective they will be used. 
Therefore, from a modeling point of view, these categories are certain. In reality, 
several of the categories used in this analysis have an inherent uncertainty and, 
therefore, they are not included in the calculation of reserves-to-production ratios 
commonly reported in the literature (e.g., BP, 2003). 
Figure 12 presents the global resources-to-production ratios (Ru/P) for oil and natural 
gas in the baseline scenario. As can be seen, under our moderate assumptions about 
their resource base and the rapidly-increasing consumption patterns implied by the 
assumed energy demands and technology dynamics in this scenario, Ru/P ratios for both 
of these fossil primary-energy resources significantly decline along the 21st century. By 
the year 2050, Ru/P ratios for oil and gas have gone down to approximately 59 and 56 
years respectively and by the year 2100, the figures for both of them reach about 9 
years. 
                                               
6
 See Turton and Barreto (2004) for details on the assumptions about the fossil resource base in the ERIS 
model in our scenario. The categories labeled as unconventional resources and additional occurrences in 
Rogner (1997, 2000) were not considered. 
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Figure 12: Global resources-to-production (Ru/P) ratios for oil and natural gas in the baseline 
scenario. 
5. The Impact of a Carbon-equivalent Tax 
A carbon (equivalent) tax is a generic climate policy instrument that provides an 
incentive to shift toward low-emissions technologies without imposing a cap on GHG 
emissions. Here, we consider the imposition of a tax on the carbon-equivalent emissions 
of the three main GHGs (CO2, CH4 and N2O) at the global level. In this section, we 
discuss the impacts of applying C-eq taxes ranging from $0-1000/ton C-eq. The 
discussion will be concentrated on the impact of the C-eq tax on the sustainability 
indicators of interest in this study. 
The impact measure is defined here as the Delta Indicator/Instrument Cost ratio. “Delta 
Indicator” is the incremental change in a given indicator relative to the baseline case, 
i.e., the case without the application of the policy instrument. By convention, positive 
values of impacts imply an improvement in the respective sustainability indicator and 
vice versa. That is, for the climate-change indicators, such as CO2 concentration and 
global temperature change, an improvement represents a decrease in the indicator. For 
other indicators, such as the resources-to-production (Ru/P) ratios used here to measure 
security of energy supply, an improvement is represented by an increase in the 
indicator. 
“Instrument Cost” is the estimated cost of applying a given policy instrument. For the 
carbon-equivalent tax we use the difference in total discounted system costs between a 
baseline case with zero C-eq tax and the case where a non-zero C-eq tax is imposed on 
the global energy system, subtracting the tax revenues. In our partial-equilibrium 
modeling framework this is equivalent to the loss of consumer surplus. 
5.1 Impact of a carbon-equivalent tax on climate change 
In this section we discuss the impact of the carbon-equivalent tax on the climate-change 
indicators. Before proceeding with the discussion, we illustrate with an example how 
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the impact measure used in this report is derived. Figure 13 presents one selected 
climate-change indicator, CO2 concentration in the atmosphere for the year 2100 in this 
case, as a function of the C-eq tax. The total discounted system costs resulting in each 
case after the imposition of a non-zero C-eq tax are also shown, after subtracting the C-
eq tax revenue. As expected, an increasing C-eq tax results in a reduction of the CO2 
concentration in the atmosphere, as compared with the baseline scenario. The decline in 
CO2 concentration is steeper for low C-eq tax values but it becomes less pronounced at 
higher C-eq tax levels. 
The imposition of the C-eq tax induces technological change towards energy sources 
and technologies with low GHG emissions, which result in a higher total discounted 
energy-system cost than in the baseline case. At low C-eq tax levels, low-cost 
abatement measures, such as the mitigation opportunities of non-CO2 GHGs and forest 
sinks, are exhausted. At higher tax levels, more expensive mitigation options, such as 
CO2 capture and storage (CCS) and deployment of fuel-cell hydrogen vehicles in the 
transportation sector, are tapped. 
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Figure 13: CO2 concentration in the atmosphere for the year 2100 and total discounted system 
costs (subtracting the C-eq tax revenue) as a function of the C-eq tax. 
Using these values, the differences in CO2 concentration and total discounted system 
costs (subtracting the C-eq tax revenue), relative to the baseline scenario can be 
computed. The corresponding change in CO2 concentration (“delta indicator”) and the 
change in total discounted system costs (“instrument cost”) are shown in Figure 14. 
Notice that, by convention, we are assuming that positive values of the impact measure 
mean an improvement in the sustainability indicator. In the case of the climate 
indicators used here, an improvement is represented by an actual reduction in the 
magnitude of the indicator, e.g., a reduction in the atmospheric concentration of CO2. 
For those indicators, we use a minus sign in front of the change in concentrations when 
computing the “delta indicator” variable. 
Using these two variables, namely the delta in CO2 concentration in the year 2100 and 
the instrument cost, the impact of the C-eq tax on CO2 concentration can be estimated as 
the above-described ratio. Figure 15 presents the impact on CO2 concentration for the 
range of C-eq taxes examined. 
IR_05_002.doc  15
0
50
100
150
200
0 200 400 600 800 1000
GHG tax rate (US$/ton C-eq)
D
el
ta
 
CO
2 
Co
n
c
e
n
tr
a
tio
n
 
(p
pm
v
)
0
1
2
3
4
5
In
s
tr
um
e
n
t C
os
t f
or
 th
e 
C-
e
q 
Ta
x
  
(T
ril
lio
n
 
U
S$
20
00
)
Delta CO2 Concentration
Instrument Cost (C-eq tax)
 
Figure 14: “Delta indicator” for the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere (year 2100) and the 
corresponding “instrument cost”, computed as the difference between the total discounted 
system costs in the C-eq-tax case (subtracting the C-eq tax revenue) and those of the baseline 
scenario. By convention, a positive impact means an improvement in the indicator (in this 
example a reduction on the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere). Therefore, the delta indicator 
is computed with a minus sign in front in this case. 
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Figure 15: Impact of the carbon-equivalent tax on the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere for 
the year 2100 as a function of the carbon-equivalent tax. The impact measure is computed as the 
ratio between the difference in CO2 concentration in the baseline scenario and the C-eq tax case 
and the corresponding instrument cost (difference in total discounted energy-system costs 
subtracting the C-eq tax revenue). By convention, a positive impact means an improvement in 
the indicator (in this case a reduction on the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere). 
As can be seen in Figure 15, at low C-eq tax levels, the impact on the CO2 concentration 
indicator is high. That is, with a relatively small C-eq tax rate cheap mitigation options 
can be tapped and a relatively large change in CO2 concentration is achieved. However, 
the impact decreases as the C-eq tax rate is raised. This is so because the incremental 
reduction of CO2 concentration achieved with a given level of carbon-equivalent tax 
becomes increasingly smaller, as mitigation options are exhausted, while the 
corresponding costs of application of the policy instrument become higher, as more 
expensive mitigation options have to be introduced at higher C-eq tax levels. 
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We now discuss the impacts of the C-eq tax on the other climate-change sustainability 
indicators examined here. Figure 16 presents atmospheric concentrations of CH4 and 
N2O for the year 2100 as a function of the C-eq tax rate. These two GHGs offer 
potential for cheap abatement options, which is exhausted at low C-eq tax rates. CH4 
concentrations decrease substantially as the C-eq tax rate becomes higher. However, the 
decrease is steeper at lower C-eq tax levels, where most of the CH4 abatement options 
are introduced. Notice that in the case of a C-eq tax rate of 1000 US$/ton, most of the 
mitigation occurs in CO2 emissions and the CH4 concentration is slightly higher for this 
case than it is for a C-eq tax of 500 US$/ton. 
As for N2O, abatement options are available from 20 US$/ton C-eq. Therefore, C-eq tax 
rates below this value do not lead to any abatement of this greenhouse gas. Once the C-
eq tax surpasses this threshold, abatement of N2O takes place. However, as mentioned 
above, due to data constraints of the US EPA (2003) study, we have assumed a 
significant portion of N2O emissions to be non-abated (i.e., no marginal abatement 
curve is specified, see the category N2ONA in Figure 5 above). Thus, after an initial 
steep decline, N2O concentrations remain unaffected by the increase in the C-eq tax 
rate. Because of this reason, we have chosen not to report impacts on this particular 
indicator in this study. 
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Figure 16: CH4 and N2O concentrations in the atmosphere for the year 2100 as a function of the 
C-eq tax. 
Figure 17 presents the impact of the carbon-equivalent tax on the CH4 concentration in 
the atmosphere for the year 2100 as a function of the carbon-equivalent tax. As in the 
case of CO2 concentration above, the impact is higher at low C-eq tax rates, where the 
cheaper options for CH4 mitigation are available and decline at higher C-eq tax rates. 
Figure 18 presents the global temperature change and sea-level rise indicators for the 
year 2100 as a function of the C-eq tax rate. As expected, the C-eq tax results in smaller 
GHG emissions and, therefore, in smaller GHG concentrations in the atmosphere, which 
in their turn lead to a lower climate forcing. As a result, both global temperature change 
and sea-level rise are reduced as the C-eq tax rate increases. However, since there is 
considerable inertia in the climate system (IPCC, 2001a) due, among others, to the slow 
transport of heat into the oceans and slow response of ice sheets, the response of surface 
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air temperature and sea level to the C-eq tax is much slower and is less pronounced than 
that of GHG concentrations. 
Also, notice that a C-eq tax rate of 1000 US$/ton C-eq produces slightly higher global 
temperature change and sea-level rise than a 500 US$/ton C-eq tax. The reason for this 
lies in the difference between SO2 emissions in these two cases. SO2 emissions in the 
ERIS model are mainly linked to coal production and use. A C-eq tax of 1000 US$/ton 
C-eq produces a strong reduction in coal consumption and, therefore, in the associated 
SO2 emissions (see Figure 19 below). Since SO2 has a negative climate forcing, a 
reduction in SO2 emissions leads to an increase in the total climate forcing and, 
therefore, slightly higher temperature change and sea-level rise in the case of a US$ 
1000/ton C-eq tax than it is for a tax of 500 US$/ton. 
Figure 20 presents the impact of the C-eq tax on global temperature change and global 
sea-level rise in the year 2100 as a function of the C-eq tax rate. As before, impacts are 
generally higher at lower C-eq tax rates and decline at higher levels. 
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Figure 17: Impact of the carbon-equivalent tax on the CH4 concentration in the atmosphere for 
the year 2100 as a function of the carbon-equivalent tax.  
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Figure 18: Global temperature change and annual sea-level rise in the year 2100 as a function of 
the C-eq tax. 
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Figure 19: Comparison of SO2 emissions for the cases with C-eq tax rates of 500 US$/ton C-eq 
and 1000 US$/ton C-eq. According to the specifications of the MAGICC model, SO2 emissions 
are measured relative to the values in the year 1990. 
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Figure 20: Impact of the carbon-equivalent tax on global annual temperature change and global 
annual sea-level rise in the year 2100 as a function of the carbon-equivalent tax. The impact 
measure is computed as the ratio between the difference in the respective indicator in the 
baseline scenario and the C-eq tax case and the corresponding instrument cost (difference in 
total discounted energy-system costs, subtracting the C-eq tax revenue). By convention, a 
positive impact means an improvement in the indicator (a reduction in the global temperature 
change or sea-level rise). 
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5.2 Impact of a carbon-equivalent tax on the security of energy supply 
We now turn to discuss the impacts of the carbon-equivalent tax on the global indicators 
of the security of energy supply, i.e., the long-term resources-to-production (Ru/P) 
ratios for oil and natural gas in the year 2050.7 Notice that for these two sustainability 
indicators an increase relative to the baseline means an improvement and vice versa. 
Figure 21 presents these two indicators as a function of the C-eq tax rate. The effect of 
the C-eq tax on the global oil Ru/P is fairly consistent. Increasing the carbon-equivalent 
tax leads to an increase in the oil Ru/P ratio (an improvement). That is, with a higher tax 
imposed on GHG emissions, the global energy system weans away from oil, a CO2-
intensive fossil energy source, towards less carbon-intensive fossil fuels like natural gas 
and non-fossil resources (renewables and nuclear energy). 
The effect of the C-eq tax on the global Ru/P ratio for gas is less consistent, as the 
fluctuations in the indicator show. However, some trends are recognizable. Specifically, 
relatively low levels of the C-eq tax lead to a decrease in the Ru/P ratio of natural gas. 
That is, a larger consumption of natural gas takes place as the system moves away from 
the more carbon-intensive coal and oil fossil resources. At larger C-eq tax rates, more 
expensive non-fossil resources and technologies are introduced and the gas Ru/P 
increases again. Above approximately 100 US$/ton C-eq, the Ru/P ratio of natural gas 
remains more or less unaffected by further increases in the C-eq tax rate. 
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Figure 21: Long-term global resources-to-production (Ru/P) ratio (in years) of natural gas and 
oil for the year 2050 as a function of the C-eq tax rate. 
Accordingly, the impact of the C-eq tax on the natural gas Ru/P ratio (Figure 22) shows 
significant fluctuations between positive and negative values before finally becoming 
positive and declining at large C-eq tax levels. The impact on the oil Ru/P ratio 
(Figure 23) is, as with other indicators discussed above, higher a low C-eq tax rates and 
declines at larger C-eq tax levels. 
                                               
7
 Notice that the resources-to-production (Ru/P) ratios for oil and natural gas are reported here for a given 
year (2050). As such, the indicators represent a “snapshot”, rather than a dynamic picture, of the changes 
in consumption of oil and natural gas in a given case. 
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Figure 22: Impact of the C-eq tax on the long-term resources-to-production (Ru/P) ratio of 
natural gas for the year 2050 as a function of the C-eq tax rate. 
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Figure 23: Impact of the C-eq tax on the long-term resources-to-production ratio of oil for the 
year 2050 as a function of the C-eq tax rate. 
As a final comment, it should be noticed that one cannot separate these results from the 
baseline scenario they are associated with and described above. The developments of 
the baseline scenario provide the context in which the emission reductions of the GHG 
mitigation scenario take place (Roehrl and Riahi, 2000; IPCC, 2001b). The baseline 
dynamics, in combination with the level of the carbon-equivalent tax imposed on the 
global energy system, determine how difficult it is to achieve the corresponding 
reduction in emissions and which technologies, and to what extent, intervene in the 
GHG mitigation strategy. Therefore, they have an effect on the quantification of the 
impact of a given policy instrument, the C-eq tax in this case, on sustainability 
indicators. 
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6. Impact of Demonstration and Deployment (D&D) Programs 
We now examine the impact of energy-related D&D programs on the sustainability 
indicators of interest in this study. Demonstration and deployment (D&D) programs 
enable the accumulation of valuable experience in the marketplace. From this 
experience, performance and/or cost improvements may result, which could improve the 
competitiveness and facilitate a broader deployment of a given technology or cluster of 
technologies. Specifically, a strategic management of niche markets, where the 
technology may be attractive due to specific advantages or particular applications, may 
stimulate the diffusion process of a given technology or cluster of related and/or 
complementary technologies (Kemp, 1997). A successful introduction of the technology 
in niche markets can contribute to build up the confidence of potential users, equipment 
manufacturers and other social actors, such as policy makers. 
For the evaluation of the impacts of demonstration and deployment programs we apply 
the notion of “shocks”, i.e., small one-off incremental variations in the cumulative 
capacity of a given technology at the beginning of the time horizon (the year 2000). In 
order to provide a realistic treatment of technology demonstration and deployment 
programs the D&D, or capacity, “shocks” affect an entire technology comprising a 
number of learning and non-learning components, rather than an isolated key 
component. The rationale behind this approach is that it is not possible to deploy a 
single component without also installing the rest of the system necessary for its 
operation. 
In this section, we report the result of orthogonal D&D shocks (i.e., one technology at 
the time) of 10 billion dollars (US$2000) size applied to a large number of energy 
technologies. A standard D&D shock size has been chosen in order to be able to 
compare the effects of D&D shocks for different technologies on a common basis. This 
gives a policy maker a clearer notion of what the impacts on sustainability indicators 
would be if a given sum of money is invested on a D&D program for a particular 
technology. Also, the D&D shocks shed some light into which technology would 
provide a larger “return-to-investment” on sustainability indicators if a corresponding 
D&D program of the above-mentioned size would be undertaken. In doing so, the use of 
a standard size for the D&D shock greatly facilitates the comparison across 
technologies. 
Our analysis follows the notion of “impact” explained above, i.e., the impact of D&D 
programs is computed as the ratio Delta Indicator/Instrument Cost. In such context, the 
“delta indicator” numerator is computed as above relative to the baseline scenario. The 
costs of D&D programs are measured at “face value”, i.e., as the respective D&D 
expenditures that constitute a “shock”. 
Orthogonal shocks have been performed for electricity generation, fuel production and 
passenger-car technologies. The list of technologies and their abbreviations can be 
found in Table 1 (see also Appendix). In section 5 below, we examine the effects of 
combining these orthogonal D&D shocks with a wide range of C-eq taxes. 
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Table 1: Description and abbreviations of technologies in the electricity generation, fuel 
production and passenger-car sectors for which D&D shocks were performed. 
Sector Abbreviation Description 
HCA Advanced coal power plant (Integrated Gasification 
Combined Cycle, IGCC) 
GCC Gas-fired combined-cycle gas turbine 
GTR Gas-fired single-cycle gas turbine 
GFC Gas-fired high temperature fuel cell 
NNU Advanced nuclear power plant 
SPV Solar photo-voltaics 
WND Wind turbine 
Electricity 
generation 
HEF Hydrogen fuel cell 
SYNFNE Synthetic fuels from coal (Fischer-Tropsch liquids) 
BIOALNE Alcohol from biomass (methanol) 
GASALNE Alcohol from natural gas (methanol) 
GASH2NE Hydrogen from natural gas 
COALH2NE Hydrogen from coal 
Fuel 
production 
BIOH2NE Hydrogen from biomass 
ICH Gasoline-powered hybrid-ICE-electric car 
IGH Gas-powered hybrid-ICE-electric car 
IAH Alcohol-powered hybrid-ICE-electric car 
IHH Hydrogen-powered hybrid-ICE-electric car 
PFC Gasoline-powered fuel-cell car 
AFC Alcohol-powered fuel-cell car 
Passenger 
cars  
HFC Hydrogen-powered fuel-cell car 
 
It is important to notice that, among other factors, the clusters approach to technology 
learning may have a significant impact on the results, because of the interactions it 
creates between technologies. When a given technology receives a D&D shock, this 
implies a stimulus for the installations of its learning and non-learning components. 
Through the action of clusters, the D&D “shock” represents a stimulus to deploy other 
technologies sharing the key learning components as well. 
Under the action of the underlying technology learning mechanism, our perfect 
foresight model has a tendency to either install a technology to the maximum allowable 
extent or not to install it at all. This is typically referred to as “all-or-nothing” behavior. 
Under these conditions, the clusters approach may lead to the installation of 
technologies sharing key components with the technology that receives the D&D shock. 
This is due to the fact that additional cumulative capacity in one of the members of the 
cluster will lead to a reduction in the investment costs of the key technology, thus 
bringing a cost reduction to all the members of the cluster. This may result in some 
apparently counterintuitive results, but it actually represents a better representation of 
how technological change would be stimulated in the real world, i.e., the fact that the 
presence of technology spillovers lead to the co-evolution of related and/or 
complementary technologies (Nakićenović, 1997). 
The final outcome will also depend on other factors. Among others, absolute and/or 
market penetration constraints, learning rates and floor costs, resource potentials, costs 
and availability, cluster membership, etc., play an important role in the competition 
between technologies in our perfect foresight optimization modeling framework. In 
order to illustrate the role of these and other factors, below we describe one example of 
a demonstration and deployment (D&D) shock in detail. 
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6.1 An illustrative demonstration and deployment (D&D) shock 
Before presenting the results for the whole set of technologies, we illustrate the effects 
of a demonstration and deployment (D&D) shock with an example. This example 
illustrates some of the impacts and interactions that a comprehensive energy-system 
model like ERIS is able to examine. It also provides some indication of the possible 
difficulties that may arise when comparing a large number of scenarios. 
A shock of US$10 billion gross8 was applied in the base year (2000) to advanced coal-
based electricity generation, modeled in ERIS as integrated gasification combined cycle 
(IGCC) generation. This shock is equivalent to 6,000 MW of generation capacity, or 
around 3 large power stations.9 
As described in Turton and Barreto (2004), the IGCC (denoted HCA, for hard coal 
advanced) technology comprises learning and non-learning components shared by other 
technologies. Of the learning technologies, the gasifier is also used in fuel production 
(Fischer-Tropsch liquids, H2 from coal and biomass and alcohols from biomass) and the 
gas turbine is used in other electricity generation technologies (including the gas turbine 
and gas combined-cycle generation). A D&D shock on the advanced coal generation 
technology could be expected to have an impact on these technologies that use a 
common component. Furthermore, the shock may also have an impact on other 
technologies (with which the IGCC shares no common components), particularly on 
other competing electricity generation technologies. 
The impact on the future energy system of a D&D shock on advanced coal generation 
projected by the ERIS model is significant and fairly extensive. Figure 24 presents the 
global electricity generation mix under a D&D shock (HCA) scenario for the period 
2000-2100. Figure 25 presents a comparison of the global electricity generation mix 
under baseline (no-shock) and D&D shock (HCA) scenarios for the year 2100. 
Overall electricity generation is roughly equal under each scenario and increases over 9-
fold over the century. In the D&D shock scenario, the share of electricity supplied from 
advanced coal generation technologies (denoted, HCA) is significantly larger than under 
the baseline scenario (12.4% versus 3.8% in 2100). This is mostly at the expense of 
conventional coal (HCC) and gas combined cycle (GCC) generation. Some of the other 
technologies also account for a slightly smaller proportion of generation, although this 
reduction is relatively insignificant. Accordingly, although the HCA and GCC 
technologies share the gas turbine component, the HCA technology benefits more from 
the D&D shock. This is due to the relative impact of the shock on the gas turbine (GT) 
component compared to the gasifier (GA) component. It should be noted that GCC 
generation is extremely competitive in the baseline scenario, and accounts for a large 
share of generation, particularly in the middle of the century. 
                                               
8
 That is, the shock covers the entire cost of the technology. In reality, the actual expenditure required 
from government might only be the difference between the cost of the ‘shocked’ technology and that of a 
commercially viable competitor. 
9
 A large D&D-shock size has been chosen in order to ensure a perturbation large enough for the model to 
show noticeable changes. However, impacts are normalized, i.e. presented per unit of currency. 
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Figure 24: Global electricity generation mix under a D&D shock on the HCA electricity 
generation technology. The technology abbreviations are as follows: HCC: conventional coal, 
HCA: advanced coal (IGCC), OLC: oil conventional, GCC: gas combined-cycle, GSC: gas 
steam cycle, GTR: gas turbine, GFC: gas fuel cell, BIP: biomass gasification, NUC: nuclear 
conventional, NNU: new nuclear, HYD: hydro, STH: solar thermal, SPV: solar photovoltaics, 
WND: wind turbine, ORE: other renewables, HEF: hydrogen fuel cell. 
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Figure 25: Comparison between the global electricity generation mix under the baseline 
scenario and under a D&D shock on the HCA electricity generation technology for the year 
2100. For technology abbreviations, see Figure 24 above. 
Figure 26 compares the impact on all learning components of the baseline and D&D 
shock directed at the advanced coal generation. These figures present an index of 
cumulative installed capacity of each component (2000 = 1). For example, under the 
baseline scenario by 2100 the cumulative installed capacity of gas turbines is 100 times 
the cumulative installed capacity in 2000. Interestingly, however, the cumulative 
installed capacity of this component is roughly the same in the D&D shock scenario. 
This is consistent with the result shown in Figure 24 and Figure 25, where some of the 
additional installation of HCA displaced GCC generation. In contrast, Figure 26 shows 
that under the D&D shock scenario by the end of the century the total installation of 
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gasifiers is 50% higher than in the baseline. Moreover, the rate of installation is 
accelerated by approximately one decade in the shock scenario. 
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Figure 26: Comparison between the cumulative installations of key components under the 
baseline scenario and the D&D shock on the HCA electricity generation technology. 
Cumulative capacity is relative to that in the year 2000 (set to 1 as reference). The abbreviations 
of the key components are as follows: FC: fuel cell, SFC: stationary fuel cell, GT: gas turbine, 
GA: gasifier, SR: steam or auto-thermal reformer, AN: advanced nuclear, AP: solar 
photovoltaics, AW: wind turbines, HY: hybrid battery system, CA: CO2 adsorption and 
stripping, AG: gas non-electric. Note: the Y-axis scale in this graph is logarithmic. For the 
relation between learning components and technologies see Appendix. 
There are a number of other interesting results presented in Figure 26. In particular, the 
uptake of the hybrid electric vehicle (HEV) battery system (also used in fuel-cell cars) is 
substantially higher under the shock scenario (for example, in 2050 cumulative installed 
capacity is 2.7-times the level in the baseline scenario). This component is 
technologically unrelated to the components used in the HCA, and is far removed also 
from the electricity generation sector. For this reason this result is the subject of more 
detailed analysis below. Of the other components, there is slightly slower uptake of the 
FC and SFC under the shock scenario (in 2050 cumulative capacity is around 25% 
lower in shock scenario). This can be attributed mostly to displacement of the fuel cell 
from electricity generation. There also appears to be a slightly accelerated uptake of 
advanced wind generation technology (AW key component) in the first half of the 
century (the difference between the scenarios peaks in 2030). In absolute terms this is a 
very small change in capacity, which can most likely be attributed to competition 
between other electricity generation technologies. 
We now return to the impact of the HCA D&D shock on the uptake of the HEV battery 
system. Figure 27 shows the share of passenger motor vehicle (PMV) travel according 
to different technologies under the shock scenario. Under the baseline there is a gradual 
shift to HEVs, which achieve 50% of the market share around 2070-80 (see Figure 8 
above). Under the shock scenario this is accelerated, with 50% share achieved by 2050-
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60.10 In addition, gas-powered HEVs capture a much larger market share at their peak 
(37% versus 28%). Hydrogen fuel-cell vehicles (FCVs) remain “locked out” of the 
market (with approximately 0.4% market share in 2100). 
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Figure 27: Share of global car travel by drive-train technology and fuel under the D&D-shock 
on advanced coal generation (HCA). Abbreviations of passenger-car technologies are as 
follows: ICC: Internal combustion conventional (gasoline), ICG: internal combustion gas, ICG: 
internal combustion alcohol, ICH: internal combustion (gasoline) hybrid, IGH: internal 
combustion gas hybrid, IAH: internal combustion alcohol hybrid, IHH: internal combustion 
hydrogen hybrid, PFC: petroleum fuel cell, AFC: alcohol fuel cell, HFC: hydrogen fuel cell. 
Note: dotted shading indicates ICEVs, diagonal shading indicates HEVs, and each FCV 
technology is indicated with either no (petroleum), medium (hydrogen) or dark (alcohol) 
shading; 
The question is: how does a shock on the HCA electricity technology manifest as uptake 
of HEVs? This is answered partly by examining projections of total fuel consumption 
under the two scenarios. Not surprisingly, consumption of coal over the century is 
higher (~3%) under the D&D shock scenario, where the coal-based electricity 
generation technologies capture a larger market share (even though there is a shift from 
less efficient to more efficient coal generation). And, as discussed, this displaces 
electricity generation from natural gas (mainly GCC), with the total gas demand slightly 
lower (~1.5%) under the D&D scenario. It appears that the reduced demand for gas in 
electricity generation enables its greater use in the PMV sector. That is, under the 
baseline scenario the higher demand for gas makes it necessary to use more expensive 
gas resources earlier, and this expensive gas is not competitive in passenger 
transportation. The increased availability of cheaper gas under the shock scenario 
enables a shift to low-cost gas HEVs (as observed in Figure 27). This shift, in turn, 
results in learning-by-doing in the HEV battery system components which improves the 
competitiveness and accelerates the uptake of other hybrid technologies, notably the 
gasoline HEV. 
                                               
10
 This refers to all hybrid-electric cars considered in this exercise, i.e., gasoline (ICH), gas (IGH), alcohol 
(IAH) and hydrogen (IHH) hybrid-electric car technologies. 
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In most other energy demand sectors, such as stationary non-electric and district 
heating, the D&D shock had almost no discernible impact. However, one impact on the 
choice between H2 and electricity is significant. In the stationary non-electric sector, the 
ERIS model allows surplus electricity to satisfy demand (that is, the more convenient 
and flexible energy carrier can readily be used in place of other energy carriers). Under 
the shock scenario a much larger amount of electricity is used in this sector, and it 
displaces mainly hydrogen. Simultaneously, in the shock scenario there is much less 
production of H2 from coal (even though this production technology shares the gasifier 
component used in advanced coal generation). Another way to think of this is that under 
either scenario coal is indirectly used to supply non-electric stationary energy demands, 
via conversion to either H2 or electricity. Both coal-to-electricity and coal-to-H2 
technologies benefit from the D&D shock, however the lower efficiency of electricity 
generation actually means that this technology benefits more from the shock and 
subsequent learning-by-doing.11 As a consequence, global hydrogen production in 2100 
drops approximately 33% below the baseline levels. 
Overall, the impact of the D&D shock on total discounted energy system costs and 
greenhouse gas emissions was small. Total discounted energy system cost was around 
0.1% lower in the D&D shock scenario, although this result should not be viewed as 
significant owing to the use of an MIP modeling approach. The higher use of coal 
observed under the shock scenario results in greater CO2 emissions and hence, slightly 
higher atmospheric concentrations of this gas by the end of the century (+0.5%), 
compared to the baseline scenario.  
As a summary, Figure 28 presents the changes in the sustainability indicators under the 
D&D shock on the HCA technology relative to the baseline scenario (expressed as 
percentage of the baseline figures). As expected, with support for this coal-intensive 
technology, CO2 and CH4 concentrations in the atmosphere as well as global 
temperature change and global sea-level rise increase. N2O concentrations are not 
affected. The global resources-to-production (Ru/P) ratio of oil increases while the 
global Ru/P ratio of natural gas decreases. Please notice that although percentage 
changes relative to the baseline are used in the figure to give the reader an idea of the 
order of magnitude of the changes, percentages are not used in the calculation of the 
impacts below. 
                                               
11
 That is, production of 1 MWh of electricity requires a greater installed capacity of gasifier component 
than is needed to produce 1 MWh of H2. 
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Figure 28: Percentage changes on the sustainability indicators relative to the baseline scenario 
as a result of a D&D shock on the advanced coal-fired generation technology (an IGCC power 
plant, here denoted as HCA for Hard Coal Advanced). Please notice that although percentage 
change relative to the baseline is used in the figure to give the reader an idea of the order of 
magnitude of the changes, percentages are not used in the calculation of the impacts below. 
These illustrative results for a D&D shock highlight some of the advantages for policy 
analysis of using a comprehensive bottom-up energy system model with resource 
constraints and competing fuel demands. This modeling approach helps identify to 
policy-makers the potentially unexpected spillovers from technology-specific D&D 
policies. The case described here may be an example of a positive spillover, where there 
is a more rapid shift to efficient transportation technologies, but it is possible that such 
spillovers may produce undesirable results as well. 
This example also highlights some of the difficulties that may be encountered when 
comparing the impact of many different shock scenarios. For instance, it is likely that 
other surprising and possibly counter-intuitive results will emerge, and to fully explain 
each may require extensive and detailed analysis. This is not possible in every case 
since a large number of shocks are examined. However, this is not to suggest that these 
results would be unreliable, rather that it might not be possible to go into detail to 
explain every observed result, and only broader trends can be analyzed thoroughly. 
6.2 A summary of impacts of D&D shocks 
We now present a summary of the impacts of the technology demonstration and 
deployment (D&D) shocks performed in our exercise on the sustainability indicators 
considered here. Since, as explained above, complex interactions take place in the 
model when a D&D “shock” is applied, we do not attempt to single out and explain all 
of them for the large number of cases examined here. Instead, some general trends can 
be identified and are described below. 
Although the discussion here will concentrate on the impacts and not on the indicators, 
we first illustrate with an example how the impacts are derived. Figure 29 presents the 
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concentrations of CO2 and CH4 in the atmosphere for D&D shocks on a number of 
technologies in the electricity generation, fuel production and passenger-car sectors. 
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Figure 29: CO2 and CH4 concentrations in the atmosphere in the year 2100 for the set of 
technology demonstration and deployment (D&D) shocks conducted in this study. For the 
abbreviations of the technologies see Table 1 above or the appendix. The label “None” refers 
here to the baseline scenario, i.e., the case without D&D shocks. 
It is important to understand that, using this methodology, the magnitude of the changes 
that a D&D shock induces on the energy system and on sustainability indicators is 
small, and this may affect the calculation of the impacts. Figure 30 illustrates this by 
showing percentage changes in CO2 and CH4 concentrations relative to the baseline for 
the set of D&D shocks on energy-related technologies. For CO2 concentrations, changes 
relative to the baseline range from +0.5% (HCA) to -2.7% (NNU). As for CH4 
concentrations, the range is +0.43% (HCA) to -1.25% (NNU). 
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Figure 30: “Delta Indicator” for CO2 and CH4 concentrations relative to the baseline scenario 
under D&D shocks on a set of electricity generation, fuel production and passenger-car 
technologies. For the abbreviations of the technologies see Table 1 or the appendix. The label 
“None” refers here to the baseline scenario, i.e., the case without D&D shocks. 
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Figure 31 presents the corresponding impacts of this set of D&D shocks on atmospheric 
concentrations of CO2 and CH4. As mentioned before, impacts are measured relative to 
the baseline scenario (i.e., the case without shocks) and the costs of D&D programs 
remain constant across technologies, in order to ensure comparability.12 Also, the reader 
should bear in mind that, by convention, positive impacts imply an improvement on 
sustainability indicators and vice versa. In the case of climate-change indicators (e.g., 
CO2 concentrations), a positive impact means a reduction in comparison to the levels in 
the baseline case. Notice that since N2O concentrations are not affected by this set of 
D&D shocks, the corresponding impact (i.e., zero) is not reported here. 
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Figure 31: Impact of D&D shocks on CO2 and CH4 concentrations in the atmosphere in the year 
2100. For abbreviations of the technologies see Table 1 or the appendix. By convention, 
positive impacts imply an improvement in the indicator, in this case a reduction in the CO2 and 
CH4 concentrations. 
As expected, positive impacts on CO2 concentrations appear to be higher for low-carbon 
technologies. Specifically, under our assumptions, new nuclear power plants (denoted 
as NNU) achieve the highest positive impact on CO2 concentrations. Other technologies 
having a noticeable positive impact are the gas combined-cycle turbine (GCC), the gas 
fuel cell (GFC), solar photovoltaics (SPV) and wind turbines (WND). Conversely, the 
highest negative impact is that of the advanced coal power plant (denoted as HCA), 
followed by the gas turbine (GTR). 
This result points out the important role nuclear energy may have in achieving climate 
change policy goals. Clearly, such a role, which has been recognized within the debate 
on security of supply at the European level (EC, 2001a), has strong conditioning factors 
such as the unsolved question of processing and transporting radioactive waste, other 
safety considerations and public acceptance, among others. 
In the case of fuel production technologies, the most significant positive impacts are 
observed for alcohol production from natural gas and hydrogen production from natural 
gas and coal. 
                                               
12
 As mentioned above, in our case a size of 10 billion (US$2000) has been chosen for all the D&D 
shocks. 
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In some cases, such as that of hydrogen production from biomass (BIOH2NE) or 
hydrogen fuel cells for electricity generation (HEF), the D&D shock is not enough to 
make the technologies competitive and, therefore, the resulting impact is zero. 
However, due to the tolerance of the Branch and Bound (B&B) algorithm used to solve 
the Mixed Integer Program (MIP) underlying the ERIS model, small changes in the 
optimal solution may occur. Those small changes may lead to slightly positive or 
slightly negative impacts. Since they are within the error limits of the solution 
algorithm, these values should be considered negligible for practical purposes, i.e., the 
corresponding impact should be understood as zero. 
Among the passenger-car technologies, the largest impact is achieved by the gas-based 
hybrid-electric car (IGH) followed by the petroleum-based fuel-cell car (PFC). In this 
GHG-unconstrained scenario, the impact of alcohol-based and hydrogen-based fuel cell 
vehicles (AFC and HFC respectively) is smaller. Actually, the petroleum-based fuel-cell 
car (PFC) is not introduced under the D&D-shock case. Its impact is due to the learning 
spillovers brought about by the clusters approach implemented in ERIS. That is, the 
shock on the PFC produces a reduction in the costs of its key learning components 
(hybrid battery (HY), fuel cell (FC) and on-board reformer (SR)). Other technologies, 
the hydrogen fuel-cell car (HFC) among others, benefit from these spillovers. The final 
outcome is a positive impact on CO2 and CH4 concentrations.  
Figure 32 presents the impacts of the set of D&D shocks on global temperature change 
and global sea-level rise. As can be seen, although the patterns tend to be similar to 
those of CO2 and CH4 concentrations, in general, impacts on global temperature change 
and sea-level rise are less significant, among others due to the above-mentioned inertia 
of the earth’s climate system, which precludes rapid changes in these indicators. 
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Figure 32: Impact of D&D shocks on global temperature change and global sea-level rise in the 
year 2100 (and measured from the year 1990). For abbreviations of the technologies see Table 1 
or the appendix. By convention, positive impacts imply an improvement in the indicator, in this 
case a reduction in the global temperature change or sea-level rise. 
Also, notice that some D&D shocks having a sizeable positive impact on CO2 and CH4 
concentrations do not have a large impact on temperature (e.g., the advanced nuclear 
power plant (NNU)). The reason for this is the fact that, in several cases, these 
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technologies displace coal-based electricity generation or coal-based synthetic fuel 
production (Fischer-Tropsch liquids, hydrogen). As a result, CO2 emissions and, 
therefore, CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere, diminish. However, SO2 emissions 
from coal production are also reduced and, consequently, the negative forcing 
associated with SO2 decreases. The final outcome is the result of these two 
counteracting effects. In the case of advanced nuclear generation (NNU), the impact of 
the D&D shock on global temperature change is still positive but less significant than it 
was on CO2 and CH4 concentrations (see Figure 31). 
We now turn to the impacts on indicators of security of energy supply. Impacts on the 
resources-to-production (Ru/P) for oil in the year 2050 are in most cases positive or 
zero. In general, in our D&D shocks there is a tendency to displace oil consumption. 
Among others, significant positive impacts on oil Ru/P can be observed for advanced 
coal power plants, natural gas combined-cycle turbines and fuel cells, advanced nuclear 
plants, production of alcohol and hydrogen from gas and Fischer-Tropsch liquids from 
coal. Biomass-based production of final-energy carriers, however, is relatively 
unattractive under this GHG-unconstrained scenario. Nonetheless, the shock on 
biomass-to-H2 produces a small positive impact on oil Ru/P ratio. 
D&D shocks on several hybrid-electric and fuel-cell vehicles produce positive impacts 
on the oil Ru/P ratio. This includes the petroleum-based fuel-cell passenger car, 
although its impact is much more reduced than that of other advanced car technologies. 
Notice that, with the exception of the petroleum-based fuel-cell passenger car, no other 
oil-based technologies were considered in this set of D&D shocks. 
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Figure 33: Impact of D&D shocks on global resources-to-production ratios for oil and natural 
gas (both in the year 2050). For abbreviations of the technologies see Table 1 or the appendix. 
As for the impacts on the resources-to-production (Ru/P) ratio of natural gas, for the 
most part of the set of D&D shocks conducted here the resulting impacts were negative. 
This is not surprising for the gas-based technologies. As for other technologies, as a 
rule, the effects of the D&D shocks tend to displace consumption of gas in one sector, 
thus making it available for other sectors. The final effect is an increase in the total 
consumption of gas (in 2050) under the D&D shocks as compared to the baseline 
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scenario. The only exception is advanced nuclear power plants (NNU), which have a 
relatively significant positive impact. 
Notice that, in our scenario, natural gas constitutes a valuable and attractive primary 
energy resource. Also, our assumptions on its resource base do not include uncertain 
unconventional and additional occurrences. Thus, natural gas consumption rises and 
declines along the 21st century as its resource base is exhausted. 
It appears to be a trade-off between the two global indicators of security of energy 
supply, namely oil and gas Ru/P ratios. That is, shocks leading to a larger oil Ru/P ratio 
tend to result in a smaller gas Ru/P ratio, meaning that as the global energy system 
weans away from oil, it tends to increase its reliance on natural gas. 
Again, and as it was the case with the C-eq tax analysis presented above, the reader 
should bear in mind that the impacts of demonstration and deployment (D&D) shocks 
depend on the baseline scenario. Specifically, and under the scenario considered here, 
where no value for GHG emissions is imposed, the D&D shocks applied here are more 
likely to effectively stimulate the penetration of technologies that are either already 
competitive in the baseline or close to become competitive. 
7. Combining instruments: Carbon taxes and D&D Shocks 
We have also investigated the impact of D&D shocks in combination C-eq taxes for the 
range of shocks and taxes examined above. The rationale behind this exercise is the fact 
that policy makers may have to combine several policy instruments in order to achieve 
one or more policy goals. This is so both for both climate change and security of energy 
supply. 
For instance, an effective climate policy regime may need to rely on a wide portfolio of 
instruments. While imposing a price on GHGs, such as the C-eq tax examined here, 
would send a signal to economic actors to shift towards less GHG-intensive 
technologies, it may also be necessary to stimulate the technology learning of these 
technologies in order to make them competitive in the marketplace and provide the 
economic actors with a sufficiently broad set of options such that the most cost-
effective, environmentally-benign, safe and publicly-acceptable technologies can be 
chosen. Demonstration and deployment (D&D) programs, where valuable experience 
with a technology or cluster of technologies can be gathered and from which 
performance/cost improvements may result, could be an important instrument with 
which to complement a GHG tax. 
Selected results of D&D shocks under the C-eq tax are presented below. It should be 
noted that the results presented in this section can only summarise what is an extensive 
analysis of over 200 combinations of D&D shock and C-e tax. The purpose is to 
identify consistent trends and robust responses in the indicators of interest. In other 
words, and as was discussed earlier in relation to D&D shocks, it is not practicable to go 
into detail for each combination of D&D shock and C-e tax and analyse specific energy 
system features.  
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The example D&D shock presented in Section 6.1 should be borne in mind when 
considering the results presented here. This example illustrates the potential for complex 
and sometimes counter-intuitive results to arise across the whole energy sector in 
response to a single shock, and such results are expected to be observed with the 
combined shock and tax. However, the example in Section 6.1 was also designed to 
show that such results are logical and readily explained with further analysis. Unlike 
with the example, it is not practicable to analyse each run at the level of detail necessary 
to fully explain the results observed. As mentioned earlier, this is not to suggest that 
these results are unrealiable, but that it is only possible to analyse the broader trends in 
detail here. 
As a rule, one might expect that the effect of D&D shocks becomes smaller as the 
carbon-equivalent tax becomes larger, due to the fact that increasing the C-eq tax results 
in a more restricted technology choice, since low-emissions technologies are favored 
more and more. However, this will depend on the technology, particularly where some 
of the more expensive technologies only become competitive in a carbon-constrained 
world. For example, when the C-eq tax is high enough, carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) becomes cost-effective. Under these circumstances, performing D&D shocks on 
carbon-intensive technologies, such as coal-based IGCC power plants (HCA) or 
hydrogen production (COALH2NE), may result in a stronger positive impact on climate 
change indicators than observed at lower levels of taxation.  
In addition, D&D shocks applied directly to CCS technologies may have a similar 
impact, and for this reason these are included in the analysis here. That is, to the list of 
technologies to which a D&D shock was applied in Section 6 (see Table 1), are added 
the CCS technologies listed below (Table 2). These technologies were not included in 
the analysis of simple D&D shocks because, in the absence of a carbon cost or 
constraint, these technologies are not used.13   
Table 2: Description and abbreviations of carbon capture technologies for combined D&D and 
carbon (equivalent) tax shocks. 
Sector Abbreviation Description 
HCACS Carbon capture from advanced coal (IGCC) power plant and 
synthetic fuel (F-T liquids) production (i.e., pre-combustion) 
HCCCS Carbon capture from conventional coal power plant (i.e., post-
combustion) 
GCCCS Carbon capture from gas-fired combined-cycle gas turbine (i.e., 
post-combustion) 
Carbon 
capture 
and 
storage 
H2CAS Carbon capture from H2 production  
 
Some illustrative and summarised results for the combined D&D shock and GHG tax 
are presented below. Firstly, we present selected impacts of adding D&D shocks to 
some representative GHG taxes. This is followed by a presentation of the impacts of 
applying GHG taxes to a single D&D shock. Taking this approach helps identify the 
marginal impact of the additional instrument, and whether the presence of the D&D 
                                               
13
 These technologies are assumed not to share components with any of the non-CCS technologies (see 
Turton and Barreto 2004), and hence exclusion of these technologies from the analysis in Section 4 has 
not resulted in important spillovers to other groups of technologies being overlooked.  
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shock or GHG tax affects the impact of a subsequent addition of the second instrument. 
Finally, we present some overall results of the combined shock and tax. Although we 
still continue to measure the impact relative to the baseline case (i.e., without C-eq tax 
or D&D shocks), where appropriate we compare the case that combines the two policy 
instruments with the case where only one of them is applied.  
7.1 Impact of D&D shocks under different GHG taxes 
Figure 34 presents the marginal impacts on atmospheric CO2 concentration of 
combining D&D technology shocks with three different levels of GHG tax. The results 
are not vastly different from those presented in Figure 31 in the absence of a GHG tax 
(see Section 6.2). Again, the results highlight the potentially important role nuclear 
energy may play in achieving climate change policy goals. 
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Figure 34: Impact of D&D shocks on atmospheric CO2 concentrations in the year 2100, under 
GHG taxes of $20, 100 and 500/ton C-eq. For the abbreviations of the technologies see Table 1 
and Table 2 or the appendix. The label “None” refers here to the baseline scenario, i.e., the case 
without D&D shocks (but including the GHG tax). By convention, positive impacts imply an 
improvement in the indicator, in this case a reduction in the CO2 concentrations. Note also, this 
figure presents impact on concentration per direct policy cost, and does not include the impact 
of the D&D shock on total energy system costs.  
However, there are some notable differences from the no GHG tax baseline. In 
particular, and somewhat surprising, is that for a number of technologies the impact of 
the D&D shock increases at higher tax levels. One might expect the opposite; that at 
higher tax levels the energy system is more restricted in the set of technologies. 
However, technologies such as HCCCS (carbon capture from conventional coal 
generation) and GFC (gas fuel cells) apparently require high GHG taxes to be 
competitive, and without such taxes the respective D&D shocks do not results in any 
significant change in the energy system. Conversely, a D&D shock on HEF (hydrogen 
fuel cell electricity generation) under higher GHG taxes appears to have a negative 
impact on CO2 concentration (i.e., concentration increases). Again, it appears this 
technology may require a high GHG tax rate, but its uptake, while lowering energy 
system costs, requires greater fossil fuel use – that is, the additional generation from 
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HEF in all likelihood displaces other zero-emissions sources, and additional primary 
energy is needed for either H2 production, or to substitute for H2 in other sectors. 
These results highlight that there are GHG tax thresholds at which various less carbon-
intensive technologies become competitive in their own right. Well below this threshold 
the D&D shock has little impact, and well above it can only accelerate the uptake of an 
already attractive technology, but not transform the evolution of the energy system 
substantially. However, at a GHG tax just below the threshold level, a D&D shock may 
be sufficient to make a technology competitive, thereby resulting in a potentially 
significantly different energy system. This is illustrated once more in Figure 35 for the 
impact of D&D shocks on temperature change under three GHG tax rates. Again, as 
was shown in Figure 32 in Section 6.2, the pattern of impacts is similar to that seen for 
CO2 concentration except, again, for those D&D shocks that displace conventional coal 
electricity generation. These shocks result in lower emissions of not only CO2, but also 
SO2 which has a negative forcing. The results for sea-level rise are similar.  
The impact of the D&D shocks under different GHG tax levels on resources-to-
production ratio (Ru:P) for oil is presented in Figure 36.14 Most D&D shocks, 
irrespective of the GHG tax rate, increase Ru:P for oil, because most of the technologies 
utilise fuels other than oil, or improve the efficiency of oil utilisation. However, the size 
of the impact of a D&D shock is reduced at higher tax levels. This is partly because, as 
shown in Figure 23 in Section 5.2, higher tax rates alone increase the ratio, implying 
that there is reduced scope for further increases from D&D shocks applied to high tax 
rates.  
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Figure 35: Impact of D&D shocks on temperature change by the year 2100, under GHG taxes of 
$20, 100 and 500/ton C-eq. For the abbreviations of the technologies see Table 1 and Table 2 or 
the appendix. The label “None” refers here to the baseline scenario, i.e., the case without D&D 
shocks (but including the GHG tax). By convention, positive impacts imply an improvement in 
the indicator, in this case a reduction in temperature. Note also, this figure presents impact on 
temperature per direct policy cost, and does not include the impact of the D&D shock on total 
energy system costs.  
                                               
14
 See appendix for Ru:P for gas. 
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The direction of the impact of the D&D shocks across the range of C-eq tax rates 
presented in Figure 36 is fairly consistent. That is, those shocks observed to increase 
Ru:P in the absence of a tax also increase the ratio under higher tax rates. However, 
some technologies that are uncompetitive in the absence of a GHG tax appear to 
respond more to a D&D shock at higher GHG tax rates, particularly some of those 
technologies associated with H2 production (COALH2NE, BIOH2NE) and use (HEF). 
This once again illustrates the potential for a D&D shock to complement a GHG tax that 
is not sufficient alone to make a new technology competitive. Moreover, it implies that 
the addition of a well-targeted shock can shift the development of the energy system to 
a more sustainable path. 
Importantly, the choice of most effective D&D shock depends on the likely level of 
GHG taxation applied.  
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Figure 36: Impact of D&D shocks on global resources-to-production ratios for oil (in the year 
2050), under GHG taxes of $0, 20, 100 and 500/ton C-eq. For the abbreviations of the 
technologies see Table 1 and Table 2 or the appendix. The label “None” refers here to the 
baseline scenario, i.e., the case without D&D shocks (but including the GHG tax). Note, this 
figure presents impact on temperature per direct policy cost, and does not include the impact of 
the D&D shock on total energy system costs.  
7.2 Impact of GHG taxes on a single D&D shock 
So far in this section we have examined the impact of applying D&D shocks to the 
energy system at a number of different GHG tax levels. To complement this analysis, 
we now present the impact of applying the full range of GHG taxes in combination with 
a single D&D shock. This will serve as an illustrative example. 
It is important to emphasise that this approach seeks to illustrate the marginal impact of 
combining a GHG tax with a D&D shock. Accordingly, impacts are presented relative 
to a baseline that already includes the impact of the shock alone. In the figures below, 
the impacts are compared with those occurring in the absence of any D&D shock (as 
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presented in Section 5). We present the impact of GHG taxes on a scenario where a 
D&D shock is applied to the coal-to-H2 production technology (COALH2NE). 
Figure 37 presents the impact on atmospheric concentrations of CO2 and CH4 in 2100 
per unit of cost of the GHG tax for the no shock and D&D shock cases, as a function of 
GHG tax rate. Not surprisingly, the general pattern is similar with and without the tax – 
that is, the overall impact of a GHG tax is not affected by the shock. However, there are 
some notable differences, including the larger response at lower tax rates (up to $30/ton 
C-eq), and a shift in the point of inflexion from $30-40/ton C-eq to $40-50/ton C-eq. 
These points of inflexion occur where the ratio of cost to impact either does not change 
or increases as we move to a higher tax rate.15  This appears to be unusual because each 
unit of GHG abatement becomes more expensive as taxes are increased. However, the 
reader should remember that Figure 37 presents concentrations rather than emissions, 
and there is no obvious reason why two very similar estimates of total discounted 
system necessarily imply similar temporal emissions or, therefore, similar 
concentrations. 
Further information on the nature of these points of inflexion are revealed by 
comparison of results for global temperature and sea-level, which are presented in 
Figure 38. For the D&D shock, the point of inflexion persists irrespective of the impact 
being measured, where it occurs only for CO2 concentration in the no-shock case. 
Otherwise, the with and without shock scenarios are extremely similar, although the 
initial impact appears to be higher with the D&D shock. 
The point of inflexion between $40 and $50/ton C-eq when a D&D shock is applied to 
the COALH2NE (coal-to-H2) technology occurs primarily because there is only a very 
small change in total discounted system costs, and this is accompanied by small changes 
in indicators. If there is almost no additional cost from moving from one GHG tax to a 
higher GHG tax (net of GHG tax revenue) it implies that there are few abatement 
opportunities at prices between the two tax rates. Because this occurs only in the 
presence of the D&D shock, it implies that the shock changes the cost of those 
abatement opportunities that, in the absence of a shock cost between $40 and 50/ton C-
eq. This seems to indicate that many of the abatement opportunities associated with the 
coal-to-H2 technology (and of related technologies that share the gasifier component) 
cost between $40 and 50/ton C-eq in the absence of a shock. The D&D shock increases 
experience with the gasifier, accelerating learning and reducing costs, thereby 
increasing the competitiveness of technologies that use the gasifier16 meaning they are 
used more widely at lower tax rates than in the absence of the shock. 
                                               
15
 So, in the case of CO2 concentration with the D&D shock, the increase in ratio does not mean that the 
atmospheric CO2 concentration is higher at a higher GHG tax, but rather that the additional discounted 
system cost of moving from $40 to 50/ton C-eq is proportionally less than the decline in CO2 
concentration in 2100 associated with this tax increase.  
16
 Including coal-to-H2, biomass-to- H2, advanced coal (IGCC) generation, synthetic fuel (F-T) 
production from coal. Moreover, a shock that benefits these technologies will in turn benefit other 
technologies that share other components – for example, additional installation of advanced coal 
generation will also benefit technologies that use turbines – or closely related technologies – for example, 
additional coal-to-H2 production will benefit H2-using technologies and displace other technologies. The 
potential implications for the evolution of the energy system are highly complex. 
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Figure 37: Impact of a carbon-equivalent (C-eq) tax on atmospheric CO2 and CH4 concentration 
in the year 2100 for the no shock and D&D shock scenarios. The impact measure is computed 
as the ratio between the change in the indicator (between zero tax scenario and the C-eq tax 
case) and the corresponding instrument cost (difference in total discounted energy-system costs 
plus D&D shock cost, subtracting the C-eq tax revenue). By convention, a positive impact 
means an improvement in the indicator (in this case a reduction in atmospheric concentration). 
However, it is unlikely that the entire impact on technologies that use the gasifier (and 
related complementary or competing technologies) is confined to the range of $40-
50/ton C-eq. Instead, this result implies that very few of these occur in the range $50-
60/ton C-eq. 
This is consistent with the results presented in Section 7.1, which implied the existence 
of GHG tax thresholds at which particular technologies become competitive, and below 
which they exert only a small influence on the development of the energy system. The 
hypothesis is that a D&D shock is able to lower the competitiveness threshold. In the 
example presented here, a likely interpretation is that the shock moved the threshold for 
a particular technology from somewhere between $40 and $50/ton C-eq to somewhere 
below $40/ton C-eq. However, an alternative or coincident interpretation is that the 
D&D shock resulted in the displacement and slower development of another competing 
technology that had in the absence of the shock provided cost-effective abatement for 
between $40 and $50/ton C-eq. As discussed, there are many interactions in each 
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scenario combining a D&D shock and GHG tax, and the purpose of this section is not to 
examine these in detail for every scenario, but rather to illustrate trends. 
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Figure 38: Impact of a C-eq tax on global annual temperature change and global annual sea-
level rise in the year 2100, with and without D&D shock. The impact measure is computed as 
the ratio between the change in the indicator (between zero tax scenario and the C-eq tax case) 
and the corresponding instrument cost (difference in total discounted energy-system costs plus 
D&D shock cost, subtracting the C-eq tax revenue). By convention, a positive impact means an 
improvement in the indicator. 
We next consider the impact on energy security of supply of adding a GHG tax to a 
D&D shock. Figure 39 presents the impact of the GHG tax with and without an 
underlying D&D shock on the coal-to-H2 production technology. It should be 
remembered that in Section 6.2 a D&D shock to the COALH2NE technology alone was 
reported to have almost no impact on global Ru:P for oil, and reduce very slightly the 
global Ru:P ratio for gas. In comparison, the combination of the D&D shock and GHG 
tax appears to provide benefits to Ru:P ratios, especially for gas, compared to the tax-
only scenario. This is not surprising for a technology which assists in converting a 
relatively inconvenient fuel (coal) into a highly flexible fuel (H2) that can readily 
substitute for gas and oil, and thereby enhance long-term supply availability. For oil, 
there is once again a point of inflexion between $40 and 50/ton C-eq, although for gas 
the main effect of the shock is to reduce the extent to which the GHG tax encourages 
IR_05_002.doc  41
additional gas use (which reduces the Ru:P ratio), by providing a substitute for gas. 
However, it should be pointed out that because the shock to the COALH2NE 
technology in the zero tax scenario decreases the Ru:P ratio, the effect observed with 
the addition of the C-tax is partly a catch-up back to the levels under the no-shock 
scenario.  
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Figure 39: Impact of the C-eq tax on the long-term resources-to-production ratio (Ru:P) of oil 
and natural gas for the year 2050, for no-shock and D&D shock scenarios. 
7.3 Impact of combined D&D shock and carbon-equivalent tax on 
climate change 
The analysis in Sections 7.1 and 7.2 presents cross-sections of the ‘impact surface’ of 
the combined D&D shock and C-e tax for the sustainability indicators. We now present 
a summary of the entire surface for selected indicators and impacts. Again, we will 
discuss primarily the impacts and not the indicators, but it is useful to present one 
indicator to illustrate general patterns and trends. 
Figure 40 presents the absolute impact on CO2 concentration in the year 2100 of the 
combined D&D shock and GHG tax. Compared to the impact of the GHG tax alone 
(presented in the left-hand column of Figure 40), the D&D shocks have a relatively small 
impact on CO2 concentration. This is consistent with the result presented in Figure 29. 
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However, Figure 40 provides additional information on the consistency of the results 
presented in Figure 29 and Figure 30 under different GHG tax levels, most notably for 
the two technologies with the largest positive and negative impact on concentration 
(HCA and NNU). In the absence of a GHG tax HCA increases concentration relative to 
the baseline (0.5%) and NNU decreases it (-2.7%). However, Figure 40 shows that the 
result for NNU is sustained under all carbon tax levels and that the application of this 
D&D shock reduces atmospheric CO2 concentration by at least as much as increasing 
the GHG tax to the next level. This is explained by the fact that this technology is 
relatively attractive over the longer term, and the D&D shock accelerates take-up. A 
D&D shock to the HCA technology, on the other hand, has much less impact on 
concentrations at higher GHG tax levels, presumably because this technology can both 
increase (by displacing lower emissions generation) and decrease (by displacing 
conventional coal generation) CO2 concentration. 
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Figure 40: CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere in the year 2100 for the set of technology 
demonstration and deployment (D&D) shocks conducted in this study combined with different 
levels of carbon equivalent tax. For the abbreviations of the technologies see Table 1 and Table 
2 above or the appendix. The label “None” refers here to the baseline scenario, i.e., the case 
without D&D shocks. 
In Section 7.1 impacts were presented per unit of direct initial cost for the D&D shock. 
This presentation compared the effectiveness of a once-off D&D investment on a range 
of technologies in terms of improving the sustainability indicators. On the other hand, in 
Section 7.2 the impact of different GHG tax levels was presented per unit of net system 
discounted cost. Therefore, before looking at the combined impact surface (which is 
calculated per unit of combined instrument cost) it is necessary to calculate policy cost 
on a consistent basis. 
To do this, the impact of the D&D shock on discounted system cost is determined and 
added to the initial cost of the shock and the impact on system cost of the GHG tax. By 
accelerating the development of a technology and lowering its cost, the D&D shocks are 
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expected to reduce total discounted system cost,17 offsetting some of the cost any GHG 
tax. In some cases, particularly at low GHG tax rates, this may result in a net reduction 
in system cost. For these cases it makes little sense to report the impact on an indicator 
per dollar of cost, because costs are negative, and hence these results are excluded.  
Figure 41 presents the impact surface for temperature change. The figure shows that the 
general pattern – that is, the impact declines at higher rates of GHG tax – is roughly the 
same irrespective of the D&D shock applied, although some notable exceptions exist. 
For example, a D&D shock to most CCS technologies results in an impact spike around 
$50/ton C-eq. In addition, the impact response with a D&D shock on NNU (new nuclear 
generation) is more subdued at lower tax rates, presumably because much of the impact 
on CO2 concentrations occurs also at a zero GHG tax18 (see Figure 40 above), and also 
because this technology tends to displace those coal-based technologies which emit 
large quantities of SO2.  
We will not go into further detail in the discussion of the combined shock-tax scenarios 
because of the complex nature of interpreting the results. 
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Figure 41: Impact on temperature change in the year 2100 for the set of technology 
demonstration and deployment (D&D) shocks combined with different levels of carbon 
equivalent tax. For the abbreviations of the technologies see Table 1 and Table 2 above or the 
appendix. The label “None” refers here to the baseline scenario, i.e., the case without D&D 
shocks. 
                                               
17
 However, there will be cases where a D&D shock has no significant impact on the energy system, 
because the targeted technology is extremely uncompetitive. In this case, the shock will force installation 
of some additional capacity but may have no positive impact on energy costs.  
18
 Note, the zero GHG tax case is not included in Figure 41 for the reasons in the previous paragraph; 
being that net cost is negative and hence impact (∆indicator/cost) takes on a completely different 
interpretation. 
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8. Conclusions 
This report presents an assessment of the impacts of two representative policy 
instruments, namely a carbon-equivalent tax and energy-technology demonstration and 
deployment (D&D) programs, on sustainability indicators in the areas of climate change 
and security of energy supply. We have concentrated on the role of technological 
change in the global energy system in achieving sustainability goals in these two areas. 
The analysis has been conducted with the modeling framework developed at IIASA-
ECS for the MINIMA-SUD project. The main elements of this modeling framework are 
the “bottom-up” energy-systems ERIS model, linked with the climate model MAGICC 
(Turton and Barreto, 2004). Among others, the energy-systems ERIS model 
incorporates the effects of clusters of learning technologies, the competition between 
non-CO2 GHG abatement opportunities and energy system abatement, forest sinks and 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) and an adequate representation of technology choices 
in the passenger-car sector. 
Several insights can be derived from this exercise. A carbon-equivalent (C-eq) tax 
appears as an effective climate-change policy instrument, leading to positive impacts 
along the causal chain from GHG emissions to concentrations and, subsequently, 
temperature change and sea-level rise. However, due to the inertia of the climate 
system, the C-eq tax appears more effective in reducing GHG concentrations than in 
reducing global temperature change and sea-level rise, which are processes with much 
longer time scales. It appears that, in order to produce a sizeable effect on these climate 
variables, a strong C-eq tax signal is required. Since strong C-eq taxes may not be 
politically feasible, it may be wise to combine the C-eq tax with other policy 
instruments. 
The impacts of the C-eq tax on global security-of-energy-supply indicators can be 
summarized as follows. The tax appears to have a positive impact on the long-term 
resources-to-production (Ru/P) ratio of oil, since the global energy system moves away 
from oil consumption as the tax rate is increased. With oil consumption playing a key 
role in anthropogenic greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions to the atmosphere and being 
at the same time one of the main concerns for security of energy supply in OECD 
regions, there could be room for synergies between climate change and security-of-
energy-supply policies. 
However, a different impact can be observed for natural gas. Low C-eq tax rates tend to 
increment the consumption of natural gas, thus reducing its long-term global resources-
to-production ratio. Intermediate C-eq tax levels produce an increase in the Ru/P ratio of 
gas, as non-fossil-based technologies or fossil-based technologies in combination with 
CO2 capture and storage (CCS) become cost-effective. After C-eq taxes surpass a given 
level, no subsequent gains in the long-term gas availability can be observed. This result 
suggests that, when it comes to natural gas, the application of a carbon-equivalent tax 
may bring a trade-off between climate-change and security-of-energy-supply objectives. 
We also examined the impact of demonstration and deployment (D&D) programs in 
energy technologies. D&D programs can be an effective instrument for gathering 
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experience with a technology or cluster of technologies in the marketplace. Market 
experience is necessary in order to achieve cost reductions and performance 
improvements that could increase the competitiveness of emerging technologies. 
For the examination of the impacts of D&D programs, we have followed the so-called 
“shock” methodology. That is, the imposition of small one-off incremental variations in 
the cumulative capacity of a given technology. In this study, we have performed D&D 
shocks for a number of technologies in the electricity generation, fuel production and 
passenger-car sectors. 
The results of the D&D shocks can be summarized as follows. As expected, low-carbon 
or carbon-free technologies tend to have a positive impact on climate-change indicators, 
while carbon-intensive technologies have a negative impact on them. However, impacts 
tend to decrease as one moves along the cause-effect chain of climate change, from 
GHG concentrations to global temperature change and sea-level rise. This is mainly due 
to, on the one hand, the large inertia of climate and oceanic systems but, in some cases, 
the effects that the deployment of some technologies have on SO2 emissions play also a 
role. When, for instance, a D&D program in a specific technology strongly displaces 
coal production, CO2, CH4 and SO2 emissions decrease. The decrease in CO2 and CH4 
is reflected in lower atmospheric concentrations of these two GHGs, and consequently, 
in a lower associated radiative forcing. However, since SO2 has a negative radiative 
forcing, the decrease in SO2 emissions offsets some of the impact of lower CO2 and CH4 
emissions. This has a negative impact in both global temperature change and sea-level 
rise (i.e., a smaller decrease or possibly an increase). 
As for the global indicators of security of energy supply considered here, i.e., the long 
term global resources-to-production (Ru/P) ratios for oil and natural gas, for the most 
part of our set of D&D programs, positive (or zero) impacts were observed on the oil 
Ru/P ratio and negative (or zero) impacts were observed on the gas Ru/P ratio. With our 
assumptions on the fossil-resource base and technology dynamics in our baseline 
scenario and given the set of energy-related technologies that were examined in this 
study, the global energy system tends to move away from oil consumption under the 
D&D shocks. 
On the contrary, D&D shocks on this set of technologies tend to stimulate the 
consumption of natural gas, which in our baseline scenario, is a valuable, relatively 
limited resource. Several of the technologies examined here were gas-based 
technologies and, thus, this is not a surprising result. For other technologies, the changes 
induced by the D&D shock displaced consumption of natural gas in a given sector (e.g., 
electricity generation) making it available in other sectors (e.g., stationary applications 
or transportation). 
There also appears to be a strong case for combining demonstration and deployment 
shocks with a carbon (equivalent) tax. It appears that D&D shocks have the potential to 
lower the GHG tax threshold at which particular technologies become competitive. 
Accordingly, a well targetted D&D shock in the context of a GHG abatement policy 
may be able to provide more cost-effective abatement opportunites. Moreover, because 
a GHG tax may be arbitrary in terms of its impact on other policy goals, applying D&D 
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shocks may help promote the development of those technologies that provide more 
synergies, thereby mitigating risk. 
Demonstration and deployment programs in some technologies, such as new nuclear 
power plants, lead to improvements in indicators of both climate change and security of 
energy supply, as measured here. In other cases, such as with advanced coal-based 
electricity generation, there is a trade-off between these two sustainability objectives. 
This suggests the possibility of identifying robust technologies, i.e., those that may 
contribute simultaneously to both objectives. However, the identification of robust 
technologies requires a much more detailed analysis than the exploratory exercise 
conducted here. In addition, our analysis did not consider other dimensions of 
sustainability that could be important when defining synergies and trade-offs and would 
play a role when comes to the choice of technologies that should be supported. 
In summary, our results concerning the impact of the carbon-equivalent tax and energy-
technology demonstration and deployment programs suggest that there could be both 
synergies and trade-offs between climate-change and security-of-energy-supply 
policies. Our analysis, however, has followed a global perspective in these issues. At the 
regional level, other elements may play a role. Specifically, regional security-of-energy-
supply considerations may introduce a so-called “how” inefficiency in the mitigation of 
GHGs. A “how” inefficiency arises “when individual countries or regions reduce their 
GHG emissions based on criteria that do not depend solely on a fuel’s GHG content” 
(Brown and Huntington, 2003; Huntington and Brown, 2004). Specifically, a country or 
region may follow a strategy to reduce more the fuels that it imports than those the 
country exports. Doing so, it could have gains both in terms of security-of-supply and 
balance of trade, but it would be doing so at the expenses of its trade partners. Also, 
such strategy would not necessarily coincide with the least-cost GHG mitigation 
strategy for the world as a whole (Brown and Huntington, 2003). These and other 
aspects should be analyzed in more detail. 
These results depend, of course, on our specific assumptions and methodological 
approach. Among other factors, the clusters approach to technology learning used here 
plays an important role. Through the clusters approach we represent the fact that 
technologies do not evolve in isolation, but related and/or complementary technologies 
co-evolve and there are learning spillovers across them (Silverberg, 1991; Nakićenović, 
1997). Because of the interrelations between technologies implied by the clusters 
approach, the choice of both the key components shared by different technologies, the 
technologies assumed to be members of a given cluster and the degree of spillovers 
assumed affect the model outcome. 
On the other hand, the same clusters approach to technology used in this analysis 
provides an important policy insight. Given the uncertainties associated with 
technological change, it appears sensible to target clusters of related technologies, rather 
than individual technologies, while stimulating cross-technology learning spillovers and 
new combinations of technologies. 
Results also depend on the developments in the baseline scenario, which provide the 
context in which changes in the technology choices take place. Consequently, these 
developments also influence the levels of the sustainability indicators induced by the 
IR_05_002.doc  47
application of a specific policy instrument. In addition, impact assessment is sensitive to 
the way the sustainability indicators are defined and how the costs of the policy 
instrument are estimated. 
The exercise highlights the need of further developing methodologies for impact 
assessment of alternative policy instruments, such as the one applied here, given that 
they can provide an important input to the policy development process of the European 
Commission, in particular for the definition of sustainable development strategies in the 
long run (EC, 2002). Among others, it is necessary to extend and refine the relevant 
sustainability indicators in these two areas, improve the representation of causal chains 
from policy instruments to indicators, advance on the representation of mechanisms of 
technological change and extend the coverage to other sustainable-development areas 
and associated indicators. 
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Appendix: Learning Components and Technologies 
Table A1: Learning components and technologies. Shading indicates a learning technology, and 
a cross indicates membership of the cluster corresponding to the component in the column 
heading. 
 
FC SFC GT GA SR AN AP AW HY CA AG
Technologies fuel cell
stationary 
fuel cell gas turbine gasifier
steam or 
autothermal 
reformer
advanced 
nuclear
PV        
plants
wind 
turbines
hybrid 
battery 
system
absorption 
and stripping 
(SELEXOL)
gas non-
electric
HCC Conventional coal
HCA Advanced coal ? ?
OLC Conventional oil
GCC NG combined cycle ?
GSC Gas steam cycle
GTR Gas turbine ?
GFC Gas fuel cell ? ? ?
BIP Biomass power plant
NUC Nuclear conventional
NNU New nuclear ?
HYD Hydro
STH Solar thermal
STC Solar thermal cogen
SPV Solar PV ?
WND Wind ?
ORE Other renewables (geothermal etc.)
HEF Hydrogen fuel cell ? ?
GASNE Gas non-electric ?
COALNE Coal non-electric
OILNE Oil non-electric
BIONE Biomass non-electric
SALNE Alcohol non-electric
SH2NE Hydrogen non-electric
COALDHN Coal district heating
GASDHNE Gas district heating
OILDHNE Oil district heating
BIODHNE Biomass district heating
STHDHNE Solar thermal heating
OREDHNEGeothermal heating
OILREF Conventional oil refining
SYNFNE Fisher-Tropsch from coal ?
BIOALNE Alcohol from biomass ?
GASALNE Alcohol from gas ?
GASH2NE Hydrogen from gas ?
COALH2NEHydrogen from coal ?
BIOH2NE Hydrogen from biomass ?
HCACS Capture from advanced coal electricity 
generation and F-T fuels production
?
HCCCS Capture from conventional coal ?
GCCCS Capture from GCC ?
H2CAS Capture from hydrogen production ?
ICC Internal combustion conventional
ICG Internal combustion gas
ICA Internal combustion alcohol
ICH Internal combustion hybrid ?
IGH Internal combustion gas hybrid ?
IAH Internal combustion alcohol hybrid ?
IHH Internal combustion hydrogen hybrid ?
HFC Hydrogen fuel cell ? ?
PFC Petroleum fuel cell ? ? ?
AFC Alcohol fuel cell ? ? ?
AIRC Air transport conventional
AIRH Air transport hydrogen
COALTR Other transport - coal
GASTR Other transport - gas
OILTR Other transport - oil
ALTR Other transport - alcohol
H2TR Other transport - H2
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